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Framing the Game: Assessing the Impact
of Cultural Representations on Consumer
Perceptions of Legitimacy
ASHLEE HUMPHREYS
KATHRYN A. LATOUR
The purpose of this article is to understand how media frames affect consumer
judgments of legitimacy. Because frames exist on the sociocultural and individual
level, our research takes a multimethod approach to this question. On the socio-
cultural level, we conduct a content analysis of operant media frames for discussing
online gambling and perform an event analysis, finding that a shift in consumer
judgments follows an abrupt shift in frame. Then, on the individual level, the causal
mechanism for these shifts is investigated in an experimental setting using the
Implicit Association Test (IAT). These experiments show that framing affects nor-
mative legitimacy judgments by changing implicit associations. Further, users and
nonusers respond differently to frame elements, with users favoring an established
frame and nonusers favoring a novel, legitimating frame. This suggests that media
frames play a critical role in establishing legitimacy at the sociocultural level and
that framing potentially bridges cognitive and normative legitimacy.
Legitimation is the process through which a product,idea, or industry becomes commonly accepted (Dow-
ling and Pfeffer 1975). Over time, industries gain or lose
legitimacy through a complex process involving both cul-
tural representations and individual responses to those rep-
resentations. Scholars have suggested that the framing of an
object or concept in the media can have a profound effect
on its legitimacy (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Lakoff and
Ferguson 2006). For example, marijuana seems illegitimate
when grouped with so-called “hard drugs” like heroin in
public service announcements, yet it begins to seem legit-
imate when associated with medical treatments in news cov-
erage. When a product like Botox is framed as a poison on
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a television show like Entertainment Tonight, its legitimacy
is called into question, yet it begins to seem legitimate when
classified as a cosmetic procedure like a skin peel on reality
television (Giesler 2012). This paper examines the process
through which media frames affect consumer perceptions
of legitimacy. From ample research on priming in psy-
chology, we know that stimuli in the environment have an
effect on consumer memory (Tulving and Schacter 1990),
categorization (Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi 1985), and
goal pursuit (Chartrand et al. 2008). But we do not know
the broader role that exposure to such stimuli plays in social
processes like legitimation, which to this point has been
studied primarily at the sociocultural rather than individual
level.
In this paper, we investigate the process through which
cultural frames affect cognitive legitimacy, or the degree to
which an industry is understood and integrated with other
knowledge, and the implications of these cognitive shifts
for judgments of normative legitimacy. Combining content
analysis of frames with a field study and psychological meth-
ods for assessing implicit associations, we examine how
exposure to frames at the cultural level produces changes
in individual assessments of legitimacy, which may, in turn,
lead to greater normative acceptance at the sociocultural
level.
Our study makes three contributions that go beyond prior
research. First, by better understanding the process through
This content downloaded from 132.236.173.143 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015 14:24:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
774 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
which an industry acquires cognitive legitimacy, we can
understand how frames might work differently for different
kinds of market actors. Previous research has tended to focus
on the tactics of market actors who have a vested interest in
the industry, assessing how either proponent marketers (Gies-
ler 2012; Humphreys 2010a; Kates 2004), proponent con-
sumers (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 2013; Scaraboto and
Fischer 2013), or activists (Snow et al. 1986) create and
manipulate frames. Yet little work has directly examined
how members of the general public who may be the targets
of these framing efforts shift perceptions in response. Re-
search in organizational behavior has noted the importance
of the general public for granting normative approval of an
industry (Deephouse 1996). As Weber (1922/1978) notes,
true legitimacy comes not from endorsement of interested
parties but from the tacit, normative approval of those with
no obvious instrumental interest. This type of consumer may
not actively participate in an industry, but they grant a gen-
eralized sense of appropriateness that leads to legitimacy.
Yet although the views of nonusers have a critical impact
on perceptions of legitimacy, they remain understudied in
consumer research. In this paper, we unpack the cognitive
processes involved in framing in order to examine its effects
on different types of market actors—users versus nonusers.
How do nonusers, those who might be considered the “gen-
eral public,” receive and interpret frames?
Second, by understanding the precise relationship of cog-
nitive legitimacy to individual judgments of normative le-
gitimacy, we gain a fuller picture of the sociological process
through which full, sociopolitical legitimacy emerges. Pre-
vious research has assumed that simply being known is itself
a legitimating attribute (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Baum and
Powell 1995). However, we demonstrate that the way a prac-
tice is framed as it becomes known can have a crucial impact
on its legitimacy, especially for those unfamiliar with the
practice.
Finally, we provide a methodological innovation to the
study of cognitive legitimacy by using the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test (IAT), which enables a more precise measure-
ment of cognitive legitimacy. While previous research on
cognitive legitimacy has often deferred to proxy measures
(see Freeman, Campbell, and Hannan 1986), we use psy-
chological theory to predict and test the effects of cognitive
legitimacy on judgments of normative legitimacy. This pa-
per consequently understands cognitive legitimacy as a psy-
chological process involving knowledge integration and
classification rather than a construct based on prevalence or
endorsement.
To investigate the impact of media framing on different
kinds of market actors, we chose to study the case of online
gambling and compare it to the more established industries
of casino and lottery gambling. Scott (1995) contends that
the most informative studies of legitimacy are those that
identify the sources of legitimation on two or more levels
of analysis, from individual consumers and organizations to
cultural norms and values. Toward that end, we connect the
legitimation of online gambling on the macro level of cul-
tural framing to the micro level of categorization by first
examining what frames are active in media coverage and
then testing their effects on individual consumers, both users
and nonusers, using the IAT. Combining sociological re-
search on collective frames with psychological theory of
priming and categorization, we study the impact of collec-
tively held frames on different types of consumers and ex-
plore the ramifications of these effects for legitimacy at the
sociocultural level.
In this research our overriding hypothesis is that the media
shapes how consumers perceive the legitimacy of an in-
dustry by activating a legitimating or delegitimating frame,
which shifts cognitive legitimacy by creating implicit as-
sociations with a legitimate or illegitimate field of practice.
These shifts in implicit association, in turn, affect individual
judgments of normative legitimacy. We address this hy-
pothesis through a series of studies. First, we investigate
what frames exist in the media discourse surrounding gam-
bling, and online gambling in particular. Then, to bridge the
macro to micro levels of analysis, we use a natural event
—the FBI seizure of three online gambling companies—to
compare consumer legitimacy judgments before and after
an abrupt shift in media discourse.
To isolate the impact of media framing on consumer judg-
ment, we then conduct two experimental studies. In exper-
iment 1, we assess how media framing influences cognitive
and normative legitimacy for users and nonusers. To un-
derstand the process, we manipulate event sequence frames
and employ the IAT as a measure of cognitive legitimacy
to test (1) if frame affects cognitive legitimacy and (2) if
these changes in cognitive legitimacy mediate normative
legitimacy judgments. In experiment 2, we perform a stron-
ger test of frame effects by manipulating frame by label
(i.e., “gambling” vs. “gaming”) and assessing the effects on
users and nonusers in terms of cognitive association, nor-
mative judgment, and behavioral intention.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Legitimacy and the Legitimation Process
Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appro-
priate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574). Foun-
dational research in institutional theory has examined three
pillars of legitimacy—cognitive, normative, and regulative
(Scott 1995). Cognitive legitimacy refers to the degree to
which an industry can be classified, understood, and inte-
grated within existing cognitive schemas and cultural frame-
works (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Scott 1995; Shepherd and
Zacharakis 2003; Suchman 1995). Normative legitimacy re-
fers to the degree to which an industry is viewed as being
socially acceptable according to dominant norms and values
(Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott 1995). Regulatory legitimacy
is the degree to which the industry conforms to existing
rules and regulations, usually as defined by government in-
stitutions (Deephouse and Carter 2005; Grewal and Dhar-
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wadkar 2002). In this article, we evaluate how changes in
framing affect cognitive legitimacy, which in turn, can affect
individual judgments of normative legitimacy.
Previous research on legitimacy in consumer behavior has
focused on normative legitimacy but has not extensively
studied its relationship to cognitive legitimacy. For example,
we know that company actions affect consumer perceptions
of a company’s legitimacy, which in turn affect perceptions
of quality (Handelman and Arnold 1999) and brand adoption
(Kates 2004). In some recent research on the legitimation
of consumer groups, Scaraboto and Fischer (2013) and Cos-
kuner-Balli and Thompson (2013) show the process through
which previously stigmatized groups of consumers attempt
to gain legitimacy. Noting the interrelation of cognitive and
normative elements for destigmatizing at-home fathers, Cos-
kuner-Balli and Thompson (2013, 28) say the “narratives
[of at-home fathers] . . . indicate that the collective identity
of at-home fathers does not simply lack cognitive legitimacy.
Instead, it exhibits a form of cognitive illegitimacy whereby
their deviance from dominant gender expectations is readily
interpreted through pejorative cultural frameworks, such as
the Mr. Mom stereotype.” That is, at-home fathers are not
readily classifiable and, thus, lack cognitive legitimacy, but
they are also perceived to deviate from dominant norms and
values and, thus, lack normative legitimacy as well. Simi-
larly, in Scaraboto and Fischer’s (2013, 1246) examination
of fatshionistas, users of “fat-fashion” work to place images
in magazines and other mainstream media and make fatness
explicit in these images in order to achieve greater legiti-
macy for the stigmatized sector of which they are members.
However, the precise mechanism for how the presence of
these images in media changes generalized perceptions has
not been fully investigated. Thus although the legitimation
process represented by these two cases seems to involve the
co-emergence of cognitive and normative legitimacy, the
critical relationship between these two aspects of legitimacy
at the individual level remains unexplored.
On a cultural level, we know that the media plays a role
in the legitimation process by framing how consumers cat-
egorize industries through the language used in reporting
(Elsbach 1994; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Humphreys
2010b; Rosa et al. 1999). Particular consumption practices
can become legitimate to consumers through the gradual
change in norms and agreements between the producer and
the consumer, a process that Deighton and Grayson (1995)
term “seduction.” Inevitably, some alignment in categori-
zation occurs throughout the seduction process. Consumers
who might have once viewed marijuana as a drug come to
see it as a medical treatment. In the case of gambling, con-
sumers who once thought of online gambling as a “scam”
come to see it as a “game” or just “play,” what Goffman
would call a shift in frame (Goffman 1974). Yet while re-
search on normative legitimacy has begun to unpack the
effect of categorization on legitimacy through a discussion
of framing (Deighton and Grayson 1995; Humphreys
2010b), this effect has not been explicitly and empirically
linked to cognitive legitimacy.
The Relationship between Cognitive and
Normative Legitimacy
Construct. Scholars have debated the relationship be-
tween cognitive and normative legitimacy (Baum and Pow-
ell 1995; Jepperson 1991; Zeitz, Mittal, and McAulay 1999,
751). Some scholarship has noted that cognitive and nor-
mative legitimacy are analytically distinct but blurred em-
pirically (see, e.g., Zeitz et al. 1999). Other work has sug-
gested that in many contexts the two constructs can be both
empirically and theoretically disentangled (Aldrich and Fiol
1994; Baum and Powell 1995; Jepperson 1991; Scott 1995;
Suchman 1995; Zeitz et al. 1999, 751). Golant and Sillince
(2007) argue that narrative provides a link between cognitive
and normative legitimacy. For example, telling a story about
how a charitable organization is on a quest to cater to AIDS
patients provides both cognitive legitimacy (understanding)
and normative legitimacy (approval) for employees and po-
tential funders (Golant and Sillince 2007).
Yet while scholars have discussed the links between cog-
nitive and normative legitimacy, there is little agreement on
the order in which they occur. Different scholars highlight
different parts of cognitive legitimacy according to how they
view its role in legitimation (Suchman 1995). Some scholars
view cognitive legitimacy as the beginning of the legiti-
mation process (Rao 2002), while others view it as the end
of the legitimation process (Freeman et al. 1986). Those
who view cognitive legitimacy as the beginning of the le-
gitimation process define it as the integration of an industry
with existing knowledge structures, while those who view
it as the end of the process define cognitive legitimacy as
“taken for grantedness” (Hannan and Freeman 1986). Yet
some have objected that the criterion of “taken for grant-
edness” actually combines aspects of cognitive and nor-
mative legitimacy (Jepperson 1991). To be “taken for
granted” implies both cognitive recognition and unques-
tioned normative acceptance. Our assessment is that degrees
of cognitive legitimacy occur throughout the legitimation
process and enable or impede normative legitimacy. Cor-
respondingly, an order of effects can occur such that some
level of cognitive legitimacy (i.e., the integration of new
knowledge with existing knowledge; Suchman 1995) is re-
quired for normative legitimacy, which in turn enables com-
plete cognitive and normative legitimacy—being “taken for
granted” (Jepperson 1991).
In this article, we explore differences in the legitimacy
perceptions of different types of marketplace actors, spe-
cifically perceptions of members of the public who have not
used the controversial product as opposed to perceptions of
those who have used it. Hereafter, we refer to these two
groups as nonusers and users. Although nonusers may know
some things about the practice from what they see or hear
from others, they still lack the knowledge that comes with
the experience of engaging in the consumption practice,
experience that users possess. Of course, nonusers represent
a heterogeneous category. There are a number of reasons
one may not engage in online gambling, from explicit op-
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positional attitudes to lack of availability or opportunity.
Yet, nonusers will by definition all share a lack of extensive
experience with the practice.
Previous work has shown that differences in experience
produce differences in knowledge structures of consumers
(Alba and Hutchinson 1987) and that those with less ex-
perience will have less developed schemas (Peracchio and
Tybout 1996). We thus predict that nonusers may be more
susceptible to the effects of sociocultural framing. Framing
is likely to play a role for nonusers who are still integrating
new knowledge with existing knowledge, while it will play
less of a role for existing consumers who already have robust
knowledge structures and fixed attitudes for judging the in-
dustry.
Bitektine (2011) provides some rationale for this predic-
tion, proposing that individuals first consult classification
and only then refer to more involved feature-based, evalu-
ative judgments when those classifications fail. He notes
that conferring cognitive legitimacy on an object or concept
makes the judgment process easier from a psychological
perspective. That is, if one can classify an industry as aligned
with either “good” or “bad” practices, it reduces the amount
of cognitive effort it would take to make a judgment based
on attributes. He says, “Given the high efficiency and very
general nature of cognitive legitimacy, this form of judgment
is likely to be reserved for routine, low-involvement tasks
where the evaluator can be satisfied with any member of
the selected class of organizations” (168). Based on this
logic, we argue that cognitive legitimacy conferred through
classification is more likely to influence novices or nonusers,
who have less experience with an industry and will therefore
seek the most efficient way of understanding it (Yamauchi
and Yu 2008).
Measurement. As noted, extensive debate has ensued
over the measurement of cognitive legitimacy. Some argue
that it should be measured at the sociopolitical or “popu-
lation” level (Freeman et al. 1986; Hannan and Campbell
1995), while others see it as a construct that emerges—and
thus should be measured—at the individual level (Bitektine
2011). We concur with this second approach and argue that
response latency measures (Fitzsimons et al. 2002) can be
an effective but unobtrusive technique to show differences
in cognitive legitimacy at the individual level. Recent re-
search has maintained that cognitive legitimacy involves
“classifying [a focal industry] into a preexisting (positively
evaluated) cognitive category/class” (Bitektine 2011, 159).
By taking a measure of response time—or how long it takes
an individual to access an association between a focal object
and a legitimate class of objects—we measure the degree
to which a focal object is integrated with other positively
valenced cognitive objects. We therefore use the IAT (Im-
plicit Association Test; Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003)
to measure consumers’ ability to associate online gambling
with either known legitimate or illegitimate practices. Al-
though the IAT has been used most often within consumer
and psychological research on eliciting stereotypes, Gibson
(2008) suggests that the method would most enhance con-
sumer research in the area of associative learning processes.
While measuring cognitive legitimacy has been widely
debated, there is more consensus on the measurement of
normative legitimacy, at least on an individual level. In a
study of the California cattle industry, Elsbach (1994) de-
velops and tests a 12-item scale to measure individual judg-
ments of normative legitimacy that has implications for fur-
thering legitimacy at the sociopolitical level. While cognitive
legitimacy represents what individual consumers think of a
practice, normative legitimacy requires changing what con-
sumers think others think as well (Weber 1922/1978). Pre-
vious research, for example, has argued that media coverage
increases normative legitimacy by providing endorsement
or the perception that a practice is accepted by others (Zim-
merman and Zeitz 2002). In this article, we focus on the
cognitive effects of media framing as a means to understand
the relationship between the cognitive and normative aspects
of legitimacy.
In sum, sociological research has tracked many effects of
“taken for grantedness” but has not well understood the
psychological process that underlies the formation of cog-
nitive legitimacy. Psychologists have well understood the pro-
cess, but they have not appreciated its implications for social
processes such as legitimation. We combine these approaches
to show that there are important effects of priming on social
processes, but they require particular, preexisting cultural
knowledge and exist differently for different kinds of market
actors. Further, because the judgments of nonusers play a
critical role in attaining full legitimacy, the effects of frames
on these types of actors have profound implications when
considered again at the sociocultural level.
Combining approaches in this way leads us to three em-
pirical questions. First, do sociocultural representations af-
fect individual legitimacy judgments? Second, what is the
process by which representations shape cognitive legitimacy?
Last, does this process differ for users versus nonusers? The
key to answering these questions lies in theorizing frames
and the effects of framing on cognitive legitimacy.
The Relationship of Cognitive Legitimacy
to Frames and Framing
Frames exist on collective, sociocultural and individual,
psychological levels. As a shared social reality, a frame is
“a central organizing principle that holds together and gives
coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols”
(Gamson et al. 1992, 384). On the individual level, frames
are “mental structures that allow human beings to under-
stand reality—and sometimes to create what we take to be
reality” (Lakoff 2006, 25). Barsalou (1992, 21) defines
frames broadly by writing that “frames can represent con-
ceptual combinations, event sequences, rules and plans.” On
the individual level, a frame is a cognitive schematic rep-
resentation of the target category. It is “essentially identical
[to the] construct of schema” (Barsalou 1992, 29; see also
Lakoff 1987). The distinction, if any, is that frames can have
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more structure that can incorporate relationships of hierar-
chy, temporality, or modality (Barsalou 1992).
In applying the concept of a frame, researchers distinguish
between latent and manifest frame elements (Fillmore 1976;
Gamson 1989). For example, a manifest frame element like
the word “buyer” can activate a host of latent elements like
“store,” “seller,” and “money” (Fillmore 1976). Researchers
have shown that frames can be activated by units as small
as the presentation of a single word (Fillmore 1976, 1982).
Thus manifest frame elements can also become organizing
labels for industries, organizations, or policies seeking le-
gitimacy (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). For
example, using the term “death” rather than “inheritance”
to describe a tax brings emotional associations to a once
unemotional tax (Lemann 2000). Sociological research has
argued that media stories consist of frame elements that work
together to activate particular cognitive schemas (DiMaggio
1997). Thus even narrative structures—common stories that
share a pattern of events—can be considered a type of frame,
what Barsalou (1992) would call an “event sequence” frame.
Media frames present different combinations of cognitive
objects and can therefore change the way consumers think
about an industry. They do so in several ways. First, frames
direct attention. For example, extensive media coverage of
unusual events like homicide or airline accidents makes
them seem more likely than routine events such as common
diseases or car accidents (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
Within the realm of legitimacy, media coverage can make an
illegitimate industry appear more commonly accepted, thereby
influencing normative legitimacy (Humphreys 2010b; Zim-
merman and Zeitz 2002).
However, media framing can also enable cognitive cat-
egorization, or what Zerabuvel (1991) calls “lumping and
splitting.” “Whenever we classify things,” he writes, “we
always regard only some differences among them as sig-
nificant and ignore others as negligible or irrelevant. Yet
which differences are considered significant is something
we learn. . . . Separating the relevant from the irrelevant
is not just a logical, but also a normative matter” (13).
Because frames direct attention to a particular aspect of an
industry, they highlight commonalities between some in-
dustries and differences between others. This information
allows consumers to assimilate the frame information into
existing belief structures and contrast it with others (Sherif
and Hovland 1961). As ample research has shown, people
construct categories by maximizing similarity among cate-
gory members while reducing the similarity across cate-
gories (Rosch and Mervis 1975). For example, Moreau,
Markman, and Lehmann (2001) demonstrate that categori-
zation of new products can determine expectations of per-
formance. When a digital camera was presented as being
like a scanner, consumers expected lower picture quality
than when it was presented as being like a film camera.
However, although Moreau et al. (2001) demonstrate
these types of effects for consumer products, they do not
connect them with the broader evaluative and social impli-
cations of categorization. For example, Lakoff and Ferguson
(2006) suggest that framing immigrants as “illegal” calls
attention to the fact that they broke the law and therefore
groups them with criminals (murderers, burglars, prostitutes,
etc.). Another frame, say labeling immigrants as “undocu-
mented workers,” directs attention to their potential simi-
larities with the working class. Frames thereby shape cog-
nitive legitimacy by creating linkages between relatively
unknown industries and known industries about which at-
titudes exist. Frames help us learn about the world by ex-
tending what we know to what we do not know (Meyer and
Scott 1983). However, to understand the meaning of these
frames for consumers requires investigation of the broader,
cultural meaning of frames. Frames are based on selective,
preexisting cultural meanings; however, as a frame becomes
adopted by more and different users, social meaning can
further change, resulting in shifts in legitimacy at the ag-
gregate level.
Legitimacy in the Gambling Context
Our primary focus in this article is the framing of online
gambling using the comparison cases of land casino and
lottery gambling. As popular opinion and the political and
economic climate have shifted, gambling has gone through
many stages of prohibition and legalization. Even as new
forms of gambling have emerged, the arguments for and
against legalization have remained remarkably consistent.
Critics of gambling offer moral objections and point to its
association with crime while proponents justify it as a source
of tax revenue and form of entertainment. We will briefly
review the history of these forms in order to better under-
stand differences in legitimacy and category type.
The legitimacy of gambling in the United States has
waxed and waned since British settlement. The first Anglo-
American lottery was approved by King James I in 1612
in order to help the Virginia Company of London raise
money to sustain its settlement in the Chesapeake Bay (John-
son 1966). Lotteries played a significant role in the financing
of the colonies. However, as with other types of gambling,
lotteries have had their own scandals. For example, the Lou-
isiana State Lottery (1868–92) became the most notorious
state lottery because it was a breeding ground for corruption
(Asbury 1938). Banned in 1892, lotteries remained illegal
in the United States until 1964.
Casino gambling became legalized beyond the state of
Nevada in the late 1970s. Its growing acceptance in Amer-
ican society in the 1990s was accompanied by huge profits
for gambling providers. From 1992 to 2003, the revenue for
the US casino industry doubled, from $10.2 billion to over
$27 billion, and consumers spent more money in casinos
than they spent on movies or amusement parks (American
Gaming Association 2004; Roush 1993). More than 25% of
US citizens visited a casino at least once during that year,
with total visits adding up to nearly 310 million trips
(American Gaming Association 2004). This means that
Americans made more visits to casinos than they did to
major league baseball games. Once associated with mob-
sters and bootleggers, the casino industry gained legitimacy
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largely through recategorization from crime to entertainment
in the media (Humphreys 2010a). It is further noteworthy
that the industry adopted the term “gaming” rather than
“gambling,” although industry proponents have denied stra-
tegic intent (American Gaming Association 2012).
Online gambling is a unique context in which to explore
the effects of framing on consumer judgments of legitimacy.
Online gambling has existed as an industry since 1994, when
the Antiguan government passed a law allowing online ca-
sinos to be established within its borders. However, its legal
status in other countries, particularly the United States, has
been in limbo. In 2009, media coverage by 60 Minutes and
the Washington Post exposed a scandal at one of the major
online casinos, Ultimate Bet, and publicly called into ques-
tion the overall integrity of the online gambling industry.
On April 15, 2011, in what the media and participants
dubbed “Black Friday,” the FBI shut down and seized con-
trol of the three largest online casinos.
These events show that online gambling is far from gaining
full legitimacy. Unlike casino or lottery gambling, it does not
contribute to the tax base or to educational or nonprofit ini-
tiatives. It has been frequently associated with deceptive or
unfair practices (as in the coverage on 60 Minutes). Unlike
casino or lottery gambling, there is no industry association
or governing body. Finally, online gambling lacks regulatory
legitimacy, as represented by the current Unlawful Internet
Gambling and Enforcement Act (UIGEA).
MEDIA ANALYSIS
In the context of this history, we investigate the differ-
ences in the framing of online gambling, which lacks full
legitimacy, in contrast to casino gambling and lotteries, the
legitimacy of which is more established. We expect that
casino and lottery gambling will share legitimate frames,
while online gambling will be associated with illegitimate
frames. However, we do not know a priori which frames
will be associated with legitimacy or illegitimacy. To better
understand the relationship between frames and the legiti-
macy of online gambling, we conducted a media analysis
of newspaper articles about online, lottery, and casino gam-
bling published between 1980 and 2010.
Data and Methods
Sample. A data set of newspaper articles on three topics
—lottery, casino, and online gambling—was created. A search
was conducted via Factiva for all articles in the New York
Times, Wall Street Journal, and USA Today with the key
term in the headline or lead paragraph. For lottery, the key
terms were “lottery” or “lotto”; for casinos, the key terms
were “casino” or “casinos”; for online gambling, the key
terms were “online” and “gambling” or “online” and “gam-
ing.” This resulted in 12,772 newspaper articles for analysis
(Nlotto p 5,008; Nonline p 553; Ncasino p 7,211). For this
study, we sampled from the three national newspapers with
the highest circulation in the United States (Alliance for
Audited Media 2012). Data availability was from 1980 to
2010, which covers the period of national casino expansion
and the introduction of online gambling in 1994. Lottery
gambling was well established before the beginning of our
data set. We therefore have two comparison cases to online
gambling—the lottery, which was legalized in 1964, and
casino gambling, which began to be legalized on the national
level beginning in 1988.
Newspapers were chosen for several reasons. First, they
have often been used in communications research to rep-
resent public opinion (Gamson et al. 1992; Schudson 2003).
As a conglomeration of quotations from law enforcement,
civic and cultural leaders, consumers, and opponents, they
can be used to represent the landscape of public opinion
and semantic association about a given topic (Deephouse
1996; Gamson 1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Schud-
son 2003). Second, they represent a range of publics, from
the financial focus of the Wall Street Journal to the cultural
focus of the New York Times to the popular focus of USA
Today. Finally, they are relatively stable indicators. Unlike
online data, newspapers form a metric for established cul-
tural associations that is comparable over time.
Procedure. Articles were analyzed by first selecting a
stratified random subsample for qualitative analysis (1,800
articles; 200 from each publication for each type of gam-
bling). These articles were first open coded, then axially
coded (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Open codes included
concepts such as “leisure,” “fun,” and “sports,” while axial
codes included broader groups of these concepts under cat-
egories like “entertainment.” Theoretical coding was then
introduced to link axial codes to the concepts of legitimation.
Through this process, categories related to legitimacy and
illegitimacy emerged. For example, language relating to en-
tertainment framed gambling as a type of consumption in
line with going to the movies, while crime language framed
gambling as a type of consumption in line with robbery or
money laundering. Regulatory frames positioned gambling
as a sanctioned yet controlled practice, grouping it with other
regulated industries such as alcohol, tobacco, and firearms.
Following the qualitative analysis, an automated content
analysis was conducted to assess changes in frames over
time. A custom dictionary was created from the emergent
categories that arose in the qualitative analysis. Word lists
from the qualitative analysis were generated and then val-
idated according to procedures outlined by Pennebaker,
Francis, and Booth (2007). Dictionary categories and coder
agreements can be found in table 1. In addition to a custom
dictionary, a standardized dictionary was used to count emo-
tions and other standard, psychometrically tested dictionary
categories (for details, see Pennebaker et al. 2007).
Results
Media Frames. In the analysis of media frames, a clear
pattern emerges whereby lotteries and casinos are associated
with legitimating frames like entertainment and business and
online gambling is associated with delegitimating frames
like crime and regulation (fig. 1). As figure 1 shows, the
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TABLE 1
DICTIONARY CATEGORIES AND AGREEMENTS
Category Sample words No. of words Agreement
Crime charged, trial, arrested, investigation, illegal 27 .96
White collar corruption, bribe, laundering, kickback, extortion 19 .79
Regulation committee, commissioner, government, audit, tax 35 .92
Social citizen, community, neighborhood, residents, welfare 13 .93
Business industry, company, revenue, customer, service 19 .89
Entertainment hotel, entertainment, fun, exciting, hotel 20 .90
Addiction addiction, clinical, habit, mental, dependence 13 .94
FIGURE 1
MEAN USE OF MEDIA FRAME BY GAMBLING TYPE
mean number of words associated with crime is higher for
online gambling than lottery or casino gambling (Mcrime,online
p .30, Mcrime, casinos p .18, Mcrime, lotto p .17; F p 14.01, p
! .001). The same pattern exists for white collar crime
(Mcrime,online p .06, Mcrime, casinos p .03, Mcrime, lotto p .03; F p
17.35, p ! .001). In fact, one central undermining frame
appears to be the association between online gambling and
white collar crime—fraud, tax evasion, and racketeering.
For example, several high-profile arrests of online gambling
operators were made in 2004, 2006, and 2007 (New York
Times, September 8, 2006; March 31, 2007; July 11, 2007;
November 3, 2009). Each of these arrests was covered ex-
tensively by newspapers and included language like “rack-
eteering” and “wire fraud.” As one article reports: “The
authorities have arrested 597 people in 22 provinces and
major cities in connection with an illegal Internet gambling
network thought to have handled bets worth more than $60
million, the official New China News Agency reported. The
arrests—395 people suspected of organizing the network
and 202 suspected gamblers—are part of a nationwide
crackdown on overseas gambling” (New York Times, Jan-
uary 22, 2005). As this news story makes clear, there is a
network of meaning surrounding online gambling—an “il-
legal . . . network” of “suspects”—that frames the practice
according to categories we recognize from gambling’s his-
tory, such as the involvement of organized crime in gam-
bling rackets of the 1920s and 1930s. Thus the crime frame
directs attention to aspects of online gambling that are po-
tentially illegal or associated with the history of illegal gam-
bling. Online gambling is grouped with practices like pros-
titution, illegal drugs, and other black-market activities. In
the data set, the correlation between crime and negative
emotion is r p .114 (p ! .001).
In contrast, articles about lotteries and casinos depict is-
sues related to business contracts with suppliers (Wall Street
Journal, August 22, 1988) and other legitimate companies
(e.g., Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1993). For example,
one article covers a deal between several state lotteries and
the Walt Disney Corporation to produce a television show:
“An association of state lotteries has teamed up with the
Walt Disney Company on a new television show that could,
in effect, create the first nationwide lottery. Disney said it
would produce the show, scheduled to be shown starting in
the fall of 1992, to enable participation by all 33 state lot-
teries plus the one run by the District of Columbia” (New
York Times, April 6, 1991). The alignment of lottery gam-
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TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS OF “GAMBLING” AND “GAMING” WITH
CRIME, REGULATION, AND ENTERTAINMENT FRAMES
Pearson correlation
“GAMBLING” “GAMING”
“GAMBLING” 1 .099
“GAMING” .099** 1
CRIME .019* .024**
REGULATION .187** .028**
ENTERTAINMENT .093** .020*
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
bling with a company like Walt Disney categorizes this form
of gambling as entertainment. Similarly, articles report on
the association of casino gambling with entertainment fig-
ures such as Merv Griffin, the producer of Wheel of Fortune
(Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1988), television producer
Aaron Spelling (Wall Street Journal, February 20, 1992),
Miss America (New York Times, September 16, 1995), and
Celine Dion (USA Today, June 8, 2004), all relatively le-
gitimate performers or purveyors of entertainment. The en-
tertainment and business frames call attention to the prof-
itable aspects of gambling, highlight its role as an industry
that contributes to economic growth, and demonstrate its
congruence with mainstream cultural values and practices.
Another form of framing revealed by our qualitative anal-
ysis is the rags-to-riches story—an example of what Bar-
salou (1992) calls an “event sequence” frame. Coverage of
rags-to-riches stories, tales of the poor becoming suddenly
wealthy, pervaded lottery and casino articles, creating an
association between gambling and individual betterment.
The lottery is associated with the hopes and dreams of the
“working man.” For example, one article reports: “BIG
WIN: Italian immigrant Antonio Bueti of Bedford Hills,
N.Y., with his wife, Francesca, claimed the $35 million state
lotto drawing. Bueti, 49, may keep his $35,000-a-year auto
worker job. He said he went to work Monday ‘to see how
I feel, a millionaire working the assembly line’” (USA To-
day, January 10, 1990). Stories like this one draw on the
Horatio Alger myth and typically depict the elation of win-
ners (see, e.g., USA Today, January 26, 1996). Similarly,
an article about casinos reports, “Don Sarbaugh, a 54-year-
old homeless man, says that despite the $2.7 million jackpot
he won at a Las Vegas casino, he’ll keep his recycling plant
job: [he says] ‘I’m no different than a week ago’” (USA
Today, February 8, 1989). These rags-to-riches stories in-
tegrate lottery and casino gambling with cultural narratives
that are familiar and accepted, especially to nonusers. As
one editorialist trenchantly states, “powerball and other lot-
teries aren’t so much about winning as about fantasizing
about winning. Like George Bailey in It’s a Wonderful Life
striking a fortune-telling gizmo and saying, ‘Wish I had a
million dollars,’ you can dream up plans to build a business,
help the poor or sail around the world. There’s nothing
wrong with that—for most people” (USA Today, July 8,
1993). Hitting the jackpot in the lottery or at a casino is
bound up with hopes, dreams, and sudden wealth. No such
association exists for online gambling, which in the data is
regarded as a suspicious practice. One article, for example,
associates online gambling with petty crime or hustling,
framing it as a way that “wise guys” make money off of
“squares”: “‘This is a clearly growing phenomenon, and a
cheaper way for players to bet,’ said Sebastian Sinclair, an
analyst with Christiansen Capital Advisors. He added that
the new operations had become a forum where astute gam-
blers could solicit hundreds of bets, effectively becoming
semiprofessional bookies. ‘The wise guys love it,’ he said,
‘because there are all kinds of squares out there to take
advantage of’” (New York Times, July 6, 2004). Here online
gambling is depicted as a way to make money off of naı¨ve
gamblers through “solicit[ing] hundreds of bets,” which
many sources in the data set perceive to be on a continuum
with outright fraud. Playing off of the Protestant ethic, which
poses an equivalency between work and reward (Weber 1930/
2002), this event frame, the get-rich-quick story, serves to
delegitimate online gambling.
To understand the associations between the frames of crime
and entertainment and the labels of “gambling” and “gaming,”
we conducted an inner-article correlation analysis. As table
2 shows, gambling is positively related to crime and regu-
lation frames, while it is negatively related to the entertain-
ment frame. Gaming, conversely, is positively related to the
entertainment frame but negatively related to the crime and
regulation frames. This offers some evidence that the man-
ifest labels “gambling” and “gaming” are associated with
other latent semantic content. That is, gambling tends to be
associated with delegitimating frames, while gaming tends
to be associated with legitimating frames.
By comparing articles about online gambling with lottery
and casino gambling, we see that frames differ significantly
and systematically by topic. But how have these frames
changed over time? We conducted several further historical
analyses to assess the change in frames over time. Figure 2
shows the change in frames by industry (lottery, casino, and
online gambling). To avoid the potentially spurious effects
of periodization, yet reduce the inherent noise in the data,
we segmented articles into 5-year increments. Robustness
checks for 2- and 3-year time periods provided the same
pattern of results. While there is a great deal of variability
between days and over years, a few trends can be discerned.
First, in online gambling articles, frames like white-collar
crime and regulation have decreased (rwhite collar, dateFonline p
.088, p ! .01, rreg, dateFonline p .107, p ! .01). Business,
entertainment, and economy frames have steadily increased
from 1995 (rbusiness, dateFonline p .016, rentertainment, dateFonline p
.053). Corroborating this shift, we observe that positive
emotion has increased over time (rpos emo, dateFonline p .144, p
! .01), and addiction language has decreased (raddiction,dateFonline
p .098, p ! .01). While this indicates that online gambling
may have improved in popular sentiment with the general
public, it also indicates that it is still subject to shifts in
legitimacy.
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FIGURE 2
SHIFT IN FRAMES OVER TIME, BY GAMBLING TYPE
Second, over time discourse about casino gambling has
begun to look more like discourse about lotteries. This sug-
gests that there is a systematic framing process through
which an industry in the field of gambling becomes con-
gruent with the dominant norms and values of users and
nonusers alike. Although casino gambling entered the data
set associated with crime in 1980, it left the period of data
coverage bearing a low association with crime in 2010
(Mcrime,1980–1989Fcasino p .21 vs. Mcrime, 2000–2009Fcasino p .14, F p
9.354, p ! .001). Notably, however, legitimating frames ap-
pear to rise during the period in which legitimacy is being
actively negotiated (1990–99 for casino gambling, 1976–
89 for lottery gambling) but then decrease following legit-
imation.
Discussion
The media analysis reveals that, in contrast to lottery and
casino gambling, online gambling is associated with the
frames of crime and regulation. Further, over time, these
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frames remain relatively constant or cyclical for lottery and
casino gambling but have changed for online gambling since
1995 (fig. 2). Crime and regulation frames have decreased
in articles about online gambling, while entertainment and
business frames have increased. Online gambling’s exis-
tence as a deterritorialized practice, one both physically lo-
cated outside the United States and pursued only in people’s
homes, continues to contribute to its reputation as an ille-
gitimate industry. Coverage of racketeering charges places
online gambling in the same category as organized crime.
State-sponsored lottery gambling and heavily taxed casino
gambling, on the other hand, draw from a rich world of
positive cultural associations, such as hitting the big “jack-
pot” and the eternal hope offered by the rags-to-riches story.
However, while we know the universe of available cultural
frames and have a sense for how they change over time, we
do not know how they affect individuals. After all, legiti-
macy requires some individual mechanism by which gen-
eralized perceptions change over time. To begin to assess
the link between frames and the perceptions of legitimacy
held by individuals in the field, we conducted an analysis
of an event that precipitated media reframing of online gam-
bling.
EVENT ANALYSIS
On Friday, April 15, 2011, a day dubbed “Black Friday”
by the poker community (Silver 2011), the FBI seized the
three major online gambling operators. Media coverage was
extensive, and frames changed abruptly from entertainment
to crime. We were interested in the effects of this event on
perceptions of legitimacy of both users and nonusers of
online gambling. We predicted that consumer judgments of
legitimacy would be lower after the event than before the
event and that nonusers, in particular, would be influenced
by the negative media coverage.
Data and Methods
Our initial point for comparison was a survey conducted
for another purpose in December 2010, a time when online
gambling was presented favorably in the news media. At
the time, politicians like Harry Reid extolled the tax benefits
of legalization, and users appeared in the media discussing
their income from online poker. We surveyed a national
sample of online and land gamblers, obtained from Qual-
trics, Inc., Provo, UT (239 users, 192 nonusers). Note that
the nonusers in our sample all had some previous experience
gambling in a casino. This will be true for our other studies
as well. Although we opened the sample to nongamblers in
some studies, very few of the participants (about 3%) re-
ported having never gambled. Further, the effects of frame
on this type of nonuser appeared to be the same as for land
gamblers. All studies also feature national sampling of actual
gamblers rather than students in order to provide a realistic
sample to study framing. For the event analysis, first we
asked them whether they gambled online and to explain
why or why not. We then measured their current judgments
of normative legitimacy using the scale initially developed
by Elsbach (1994). The scale was pretested using methods
described in appendix B.
A month after Black Friday (May 15, 2011), we con-
ducted another short online national survey of 23 users
and 20 nonusers drawn from the same national database
and having characteristics similar to those in the first sur-
vey. (See table 3 for a demographic profile of both pre-
and post-event samples. Similar characteristics have been
reported in other online gambling studies; see Woodruff and
Gregory 2005.) Although these samples were different
sizes, consumers in both samples were roughly equivalent
in age and gender. Both samples were compensated sim-
ilarly for their time and recruited by the same agency. In
both surveys, the legitimacy scale questions came imme-
diately after the screening questions. Although these samples
contained different participants, the results, as a preliminary
field test, shed light on the impact of negative media cov-
erage on legitimacy judgments, especially at a generalized
level.
Results
We ran GLM (general linear model) with time (4 months
prior to Black Friday vs. 1 month after Black Friday) and
user type (users vs. nonusers) and their interaction as the
independent variables and the Elsbach index as the depen-
dent variable (Cronbach a p .9 and these items therefore
summed, as in the pretest). We predict a main effect of time
with higher legitimacy prior to the incident, a main effect
of user status, with current users holding overall higher le-
gitimacy judgments, and an interaction where nonusers
would be more influenced by the negative media coverage
than users. The model was significant (F(3, 470) p 27.6,
p ! .0001); time was significant (F(1, 470) p 7.5, p ! .01),
with more positive legitimation judgments prior to Black
Friday (Mbefore p 49.7) than after (Mafter p 44.1; significantly
different in post hoc tests at p ≤ .05). User status was sig-
nificant (F(1, 470) p 68.7, p ! .0001), with users having
overall higher legitimacy judgments (Musers p 53.5) than
nonusers (Mnonusers p 43.7; significantly different in post hoc
tests at p ≤ .05). The interaction between user status and
time was significant (F(1, 470) p 6.6, p ! .01). Current
users did not significantly differ between the two time pe-
riods (MusersF before p 53.6, MusersF after p 53.1), whereas non-
users did (MnonusersF before p 44.8, MnonusersF after p 33.8; in post
hoc tests at p ≤ .05).
To confirm a corresponding change in media coverage, a
media analysis was conducted to assess the change in frames
before and after the event. We found that the crime frame
rose significantly in the month after the event (Mcrime, before p
.0002, Mcrime, after p .20; z p 3.66; p ! .001), as did the
white collar crime frame (Mwhite collar, before p 0, Mwhite collar, after
p .06; z p 2.08; p ! .05), while the entertainment frame
remained relatively constant (Mentertainment, before p .65,
Mentertainment, afterp .51; z p 1.51; p p .13).
These results suggest that negative media coverage can
shift consumer legitimacy judgments for nonusers. However,
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TABLE 3
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF EVENT ANALYSIS SAMPLES
Money spent
gambling/week Age Gender Race Education
Initial survey
Online gamblers
(N p 239) $77.9 38 57% male 78% Caucasian 11% high school
43% female 6% African American 33% some college
8% Hispanic 15% 2-year college degree
7% Asian 28% 4-year college degree
1% Native American 10% master’s degree
.5% Pacific Islander 1% doctoral degree
2% professional degree (JD, MD)
Land gamblers
(N p 192) $35.1 45 45% male 88% Caucasian 20% high school
55% female 4% African American 32% some college
3% Hispanic 15% 2-year college degree
4% Asian 24% 4-year college degree
2% Native American 8% master’s degree
1% doctoral degree
Follow-up survey
Online gamblers
(N p 23) 57% !$50 33.8 48% male 74% Caucasian 17% high school
13% $51–$100 52% female 8% African American 43% some college
17% $101–$200 4% Hispanic 4% 2-year college degree
9% $201–$300 13% Asian 20% 4-year college degree
4% $301–$500 4% master’s degree
$500
Land gamblers
(N p 20) 15% 0 47.2 25% male 95% Caucasian 25% high school
75% !$50 75% female 5% American Indian 40% some college
10% $51–$100 15% 2-year college degree
10% 4-year college degree
5% master’s degree
5% professional degree
some obvious limitations to this event study exist. First, the
events in our study are correlational rather than causal. Sec-
ond, we cannot determine how much or to what news cov-
erage the individual people might have been exposed. Third,
the samples contained different consumers, so we cannot
assess change at the individual level. However, the results
do suggest that frames might have an effect on the gener-
alized level, especially for nonusers. We therefore moved
to a more controlled experimental setting where we could
isolate the effects of media exposure on legitimation judg-
ments.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of this experiment is to understand the pro-
cess by which media framing affects consumer judgments
of legitimacy. While prior research has focused on the nor-
mative effects of media exposure through endorsement
(Deephouse 1996; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002), our intent
is to test the effects of framing on cognitive associations
with legitimate and illegitimate categories in a more con-
trolled setting and to examine how these cognitive shifts
translate to changes in normative legitimacy judgments. We
believe that frames can change cognitive legitimacy by caus-
ing a shift in implicit associations, a shift that can be mea-
sured using the IAT. Based on the reasoning of Bitektene
(2011), we believe that the process may be different for
users, who have experience with the industry, and nonusers,
who have less experience. Thus we may be able to use these
two different groups to better understand the process through
which judgments of legitimacy are formed. Based on the
literature we propose the following:
H1: Exposure to a legitimating (delegitimating)
frame will cause consumers to implicitly asso-
ciate a focal industry with another legitimate (de-
legitimate) field of practice.
H1a: Nonusers will experience framing effects to a
greater degree than users.
Further, users offer us a window into a stage where the
legitimacy of online gambling may be taken for granted,
while nonusers allow us to explore the emergence of cog-
nitive legitimacy. Because nonusers have less experience
with the industry, we predict that they are more likely to
be guided by implicit associations in making their normative
judgments. Hence, we predict that:
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FIGURE 3
MEDIATION OF COGNITIVE LEGITIMACY, MODERATED BY USER STATUS
H2: Cognitive legitimacy will mediate normative le-
gitimacy judgments for nonusers, but not current
users.
H3: Cognitive legitimacy will mediate behavioral in-
tentions for nonusers, but not users.
Figure 3 shows our proposed model. We predict that user
status will moderate both the effect of frame on cognitive
legitimacy, the ability of frame to shift implicit associations,
and the effect of frame on normative legitimacy judgments.
That is, users will have more fixed explicit judgments re-
gardless of frame. Implicit associations prompted by dif-
ferences in frames will affect normative judgments, but non-
users will be particularly affected by frames.
Data and Methods
Participants. Two hundred twenty-three participants were
recruited from a national database by Qualtrics, Inc., a survey
company (98 users, 125 nonusers). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of three conditions: legitimating story,
delegitimating story, or no media story condition (for con-
trol). The media stories were designed to present either a
legitimating event sequence frame, a rags-to-riches story or
a delegitimating event sequence frame, a get-rich-quick
story involving someone who tried to cheat the system. See
figure 4 for this type of media story. Within the story, 10
words from the media analysis that were found to be as-
sociated with the legitimating, rags-to-riches frame (win,
play, payout, vacation, reward, thrill, diversion, hotel, ex-
citement, recreation) or 10 words associated with the de-
legitimating, get-rich-quick frame (busted, cheat, fixed, ar-
rest, bribe, handcuffs, illegal, corrupt, unfair, rigged,
kickback) were included in the article text. Media stories
were embedded to look as if they were part of the New York
Times website, which provided the same level of endorse-
ment across conditions.
Procedure. Participants were recruited online and read
one of the news stories (or nothing in control). They were
then directed to another website hosted by millisecond.com
where they took the IAT. They then returned to the main
survey page where they answered some additional questions
about the legitimacy of online gambling.
Measures. The IAT was used to measure cognitive le-
gitimacy, consumers’ association of the online gambling in-
dustry with a legitimate or illegitimate field of practice,
entertainment or crime. In this task, participants group words
associated with either online or land gambling as belonging
to either entertainment or crime. The basic assumption is
that consumers should find it easier to classify concepts that
are associated in their mind than those that are not. After
reading the legitimating story, consumer response time
should be faster when pairing an attitude concept (online
gambling) with a legitimate field of practice (entertainment)
than when consumers have read the delegitimating story. This
latency indicator—the ease with which participants classify
objects—is our measure of cognitive legitimacy. In comput-
erized versions of this task (as used here), the pairing is
achieved by assigning a keyboard key (e.g., e) to be pressed
in response to two linked categories, such as online and
entertainment, while another keyboard key (e.g., i) is used
for the other pair, that is, land and crime. The net IAT score
(D-score) is obtained from these conditions and represents
the tendency to associate online gambling with a legiti-
mating rather a delegitimating practice. For details on cal-
culating the D-score, see Greenwald et al. (2003). The Els-
bach scale was used to measure individual judgments of
normative legitimacy. User status was determined by asking
participants, “Have you ever gambled using an online web-
site?” We also asked all participants, “Have you ever gam-
bled (played a game of chance for money) in a business
locale (either casino or online)?” One hundred percent of
respondents responded that they had gambled either in a
casino or online. We included only those with some exposure
to gambling in the analysis to mitigate some of the hetero-
geneity issues referenced in the previous discussion of user
status.
Pretests. In designing the IAT task, it is best that the
words chosen are clearly associated with one category (and
not the other). Words chosen to represent online and land
gambling were based on Cotte and LaTour’s (2009) dis-
cussion of differentiating these gambling contexts. For land
casinos, the words were chosen to focus on the current phys-
ical land casino operators and what the land casino expe-
rience offers: Las Vegas, Atlantic City, touching chips, Bel-
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FIGURE 4
LEGITIMIZING MEDIA STORY
lagio fountain, buffet, valet parking, casino floor, drink
service. For online, the words were chosen to represent the
current online industry and aspects of gambling on a com-
puter: web betting, online blackjack, Pokerstars.com, In-
ternet casino, computerized betting, playing alone, virtual
dealer, and mobile gambling. Terms were pretested with a
sample of 22 participants drawn from a similar population
through an online survey company (Mechanical Turk, Se-
attle). Participants rated the terms according to their fit with
land or online gambling on a scale where 1 p strongly fit
land casino, 4 p could fit either land or online casino, 7 p
strongly fit an online casino. The proposed land and online
items were summed, and their means were compared to de-
termine differentiation, with lower values indicating greater
fit with the land casino (Mland p 10.4, Monline p 53.9; t(21)
p 117.3, p ! .0001).
The words chosen to represent entertainment or crime as
legitimating and delegitimating fields of practice came from
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FIGURE 5
IAT SCORES BY USER STATUS
dictionaries used in the media analysis. To avoid mere ex-
posure effects, we made sure that these words were not the
ones used in the media stories. The entertainment-related
words were fun, resort, joy, sport, pleasure, hobby, leisure,
and amusement. The crime-related words were prison, sin,
mobster, dishonest, felony, con, banned, and wrongdoing.
Similarly, participants rated the entertainment and crime
items on a scale where 1 p strongly fit crime, 4 p could
fit either entertainment or crime, and 7 p strongly fit en-
tertainment. Means again showed that the words were as-
sociated with their target concepts. Here lower values in-
dicate more association with crime (Mentertainment p 55.4 vs.
Mcrime p 9.2; t(21) p 210.3, p ! .0001).
Results
Manipulation Check. To ensure that users were different
from nonusers on the variable we assume—comprehension
of the industry—we conducted a brief manipulation check,
asking two self-report questions after our main dependent
measures of interest: “How difficult do you think it would
be for you to learn online gambling?” (1 p very difficult,
7 p very easy) and “Do you feel you know how online
gambling works?” (1 p definitely not, 7 p definitely yes).
The two measures were correlated (r p .67) and summed
for analysis. Users were higher than nonusers (Musers p
10.59 vs. Mnonusers p 8.24; t(221) p 6.23, p ! .0001), in-
dicating that they had greater self-reported knowledge.
Effect of Media Frame on Cognitive Legitimacy. Hypoth-
esis 1 predicts that exposure to a legitimating event sequence
frame will result in more implicit associations with a legit-
imate field of practice, while exposure to a delegitimating
event sequence frame will result in more implicit associa-
tions with an illegitimate field of practice. IAT data were
aggregated using the D-600 algorithm (Greenwald et al.
2003). Scores were calculated such that lower values indi-
cate a stronger relationship between online gambling and
entertainment (association with the legitimate frame). GLM
was run with frame, user type, and their interaction as the
independent variables and the IAT D-score as the dependent
variable. The overall model was significant (F(5, 217) p
19.33, p ! .0001). There was a main effect of frame (F(2,
217) p 44.81, p ! .0001), with means in the expected
directions, which were significantly different from one an-
other in post hoc tests (Mlegitimating p .15, Mdelegitimating p .77,
Mcontrol p .45; p ≤ .05). This supports hypothesis 1. However
there was also a significant interaction where nonusers were
more affected by the frame than users (F(2, 217) p 3.1, p
≤ .05; Mnonusers F legitimating p .07, Mnonusers F delegitimating p .82,
Mnonusers F control p .58; and in post hoc tests these all were
significantly different at p ≤ .05). For users the means were
Musers F legitimating p .23, Musers F delegitimating p .69, Musers F control p
.45. While legitimating and delegitimating frame were sig-
nificantly different from one another in post hoc tests (p !
.05), neither were significantly different than the control (fig.
5). Thus both users and nonusers showed shifts in cognitive
legitimacy that resulted from exposure to different frames.
Nonusers, however, were more influenced by frames, sup-
porting hypothesis 1a.
Implicit Association as the Mediator. Hypothesis 2 pos-
its that cognitive legitimacy (as measured via the IAT) will
mediate normative legitimacy judgments (as measured by
the Elsbach scale) for nonusers but not users. To test this
hypothesis, we conducted a bootstrapping analysis for mod-
erated mediation developed by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes
(2007) using the PROCESS macro in SPSS for Model 8
(Hayes 2012). In this analysis, frame was the independent
variable, cognitive legitimacy was the mediator, normative
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legitimacy was the dependent variable, and user status was
the moderator (fig. 3). The number of iterations for the
bootstrap was set at 1,000, with the confidence interval at
95%. Dummy variables were created for the independent
frame variable so that our analysis would test the difference
between the legitimating and delegitimating frames. The
analysis began by considering the effects of frame, user, and
the interaction of frame and user status on cognitive legit-
imacy. The overall model was significant (F(4, 218) p
24.27, p ! .0001) with a significant frame # user status
interaction (b p .29, t p 2.49, p ≤ .01). We then looked
at the effects of cognitive legitimacy, frame and user-status
effects on normative legitimacy. The overall model was sig-
nificant (F(5, 217) p 9.9, p ! .0001). Cognitive legitimacy
(IAT) was significantly related to normative legitimacy (b
p 8.4, t p 4.48, p ! .0001); and importantly the in-
teraction between frame and user status was significant (b
p 8.97, t p 2.67, p ≤ .01). We then used the boot-
strapping analysis to look at both the direct and indirect
effects of frame on normative legitimacy as mediated by
cognitive legitimacy (IAT) and moderated by user status.
Conditional direct effects of frame on normative legitimacy
for nonusers were positive and significant (b p 6.4, t p
2.25, p ≤ .05, 95% CI p .79 to 11.8) but were not significant
for users (b p  2.6, t p .98, 95% CI p 1.9 to 7.1).
When the conditional indirect effects of frame on normative
legitimacy via cognitive legitimacy were considered, the
effect was significant for both nonusers (b p 6.4, 95% CI
p 3.2 to 10.2) and users (b p 3.9, 95% CI p 1.9 to 7.08).
Indirect effect of the highest order interaction with cognitive
legitimacy as a mediator was significant (b p 2.5, 95%
CI p 5.9 to .65), confirming that cognitive legitimacy
is mediating normative legitimacy judgments when user
status is taken into account (i.e., moderated mediation). The
results of this analysis thus support hypothesis 2; frame
prompts shifts in cognitive legitimacy which in turn affect
judgments of normative legitimacy, and this varies by user
status, with nonusers being more influenced by the frame.
Effects on Behavioral Intention. Similar to the effects on
normative legitimacy judgments, we expected cognitive le-
gitimacy to mediate behavioral intention for nonusers. Nor-
mative legitimacy and behavioral intention were correlated
overall (r p .28) and more so for nonusers (rnonusers p .58,
rusers p .07). For behavioral intention, the frame # user-
status interaction was significant (b p 1.9, t p 2.3, p
p.02), but the relationship between cognitive legitimacy
and behavior was not significant (b p .67, t p 1.5, p
p .14). Conditional direct effects of frame on the behavior
were significant for nonusers (b p 2.27, t p 3.39, p ! .001,
95% CI p .95 to 3.59) but were not significant for users
(t p .56). However, conditional indirect effects of frame on
behavior via cognitive legitimacy were not significant for
either group as effects fell within confidence intervals con-
taining zero (bnonusers p .50, 95% CI p .18 to 1.3; busers
p .31, 95% CI p .10 to .97), indicating that while frame
has a direct effect on behavioral intentions for nonusers, it
was not mediated by shifts in cognitive legitimacy. Thus
hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Discussion
In this experiment, we found that media frame had a direct
impact on implicit associations for both users and nonusers.
Yet as predicted, nonusers were more influenced by the
media frame than users. For nonusers these implicit asso-
ciations mediated normative legitimacy judgments. Current
users, in contrast, were less swayed by media frames in
forming normative judgments. However, although users
were less affected by media frame according to their IAT
scores, they still experienced shifts in cognitive legitimacy
due to framing. This is important because it shows that
cognitive legitimacy is fluid even with consumers who have
more developed knowledge of an industry. The IAT’s sen-
sitivity to changing cognitive organization is a strength for
assessing such subtle associative changes.
In experiment 1, we used a news story to manipulate
frame. Yet the stories used to manipulate frame in experi-
ment 1 include a host of other information and associations
that could affect legitimacy judgments—implications about
those who gamble, the risk of gambling, or the settings in
which gambling occurs. Avoiding articulation of latent con-
tent and relying only on one manifest label to manipulate
frame would provide a stronger test of framing effects.
In experiment 2, we therefore manipulate frame by label,
using either the current label “gambling” or the newer label
“gaming.” Our media analysis found “gaming” to be more
associated with the legitimizing entertainment frame while
the “gambling” label was more associated with the crime
and regulation frames. Based on the results of experiment
1, we expect nonusers to be influenced by the new gaming
label. However, we do not know how the new label will
affect users—they too may be positively influenced by the
legitimizing label, or they might view this new label as
unfamiliar. Thus, in our next experiment, we test the po-
tentially different effects that frame label may have for users
versus nonusers on cognitive, normative, and behavioral in-
tent measures.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we manipulate frame by using either
the label “gambling” or “gaming” within the article text.
Based on our review and media analysis, we predict that
label may mean different things to different user groups.
Specifically, based on the results from experiment 1, we
predict that cognitive associations of nonusers will be more
affected by the newer label (gaming). Formally:
H4: Frame label will cause a shift in cognitive asso-
ciations with either legitimating or delegitimating
practices for nonusers. Specifically, the newer la-
bel (“gaming”) will increase implicit associations
with a legitimate field of practice for nonusers.
However, although we expect nonusers to be affected by the
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new frame, we do not know how it will affect users. One
possibility is that their thinking will be facilitated by the
label they know, gambling. They might feel a sense of flu-
ency with the gambling label that they do not feel from the
newer gaming label. Alternatively, previous research on ex-
pertise suggests that with elaborate knowledge structures,
experts are able to assimilate disparate information more
readily than nonexperts (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). It
could be that users are flexible enough in their categorical
structures to accommodate either label. Thus we have no
formal hypothesis for the effect of label on the cognitive
associations of users.
As found in experiment 1, however, while frame may affect
the cognitive associations of both current users and nonusers,
we predict that this shift in associations will be stronger for
nonusers because they do not have fixed normative judg-
ments about online gaming/gambling. The newly formed
implicit associations will thus mediate normative judgments.
Because normative judgment is often aligned with behav-
ioral intention (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977), we also test for
the effects on behavioral intentions, predicting that cognitive
legitimacy will mediate the effect of frame on behavioral
intention as well.
H5: Cognitive legitimacy will mediate the effect of
label on normative legitimacy judgments for non-
users.
H6: Cognitive legitimacy will mediate the effect of
label on behavioral intentions for nonusers.
Data and Methods
Participants. One hundred fifteen participants (48 users,
67 nonusers) were recruited from a national database (Me-
chanical Turk). We used a 2 (user status: users, nonusers)
# 2 (frame label: gaming, gambling) design. As before, all
participants had some previous experience gambling. The
same legitimating media story used in experiment 1 was
used here, except “gaming” replaced “gambling” in some
versions. This word appeared once in the article headline
and four times within the article text. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two media conditions.
Procedure. Participants were recruited online and read
one of the media articles. They only saw the term “gam-
bling” or “gaming” in the media story. At other times, the
online gambling industry was called “online casino indus-
try.” Participants were then directed to another website
hosted by millisecond.com, where they took the IAT. They
filled out some additional measures regarding the online
casino industry, such as the Elsbach scale, where “online
gambling” was replaced by “online casino.” Finally, to mea-
sure behavioral intentions, participants answered two ques-
tions: “How likely are you to consider gambling online once
it is legal in the US?” (1 p very unlikely, 7 p very likely)
and “How much interest do you have in learning more about
online gambling?” (1 p none, 7 p very much). These were
correlated (r p .82) and summed to form the behavioral
intention measure.
Results
Manipulation Check. We conducted the same manipu-
lation check as in experiment 1 to assess differences in
experience between users and nonusers. After finding these
two items were correlated (r p .76), we summed them for
analysis. We expected that users would rate themselves
higher on comprehensibility than nonusers, and this was
supported (Muser p 12.2 vs. Mnonuser p 8.8, significantly
different at t(114) p 39.1, p ! .0001).
Impact of Category Label on Cognitive Legitimacy. Hy-
pothesis 4 predicts that nonusers will be more likely to
associate online casinos with legitimate practices after being
exposed to the new label, “gaming.” GLM was run with
user status and frame label as independent variables and the
IAT D-score as the dependent variable. As before, lower
scores indicate more associations between online casinos
and legitimate practices. The overall model was significant
(F(3, 111) p 3.7, p ! .01), and only the interaction between
user status and frame was significant (F(1, 111) p 9.6, p
! .0001). As expected, nonusers had more associations with
the legitimate field of practice after being shown the new
frame label, “gaming” (MnonusersFgaming p .04, MnonusersFgambling
p .30). This supports hypothesis 4. Further, we found that
users had the opposite reaction to nonusers, forming more
associations with the legitimate field after being shown the
current label, “gambling” (MusersFgambling p .04, MusersFgaming
p .24, with post hoc tests in both cases significant at p ≤
.05; see fig. 6). Although we did not predict particular effects
for users, we believe this result makes sense within the larger
literature on framing and priming. Consumers utilize ac-
cessible experiences when forming judgments (Schwarz
2004). For current online gamblers the term “gambling” is
more accessible, as it is the label toward which they have
previously formed positive legitimizing associations.
Implicit Association as the Mediator. In our previous
experiment, cognitive legitimacy mediated normative legit-
imacy judgments when user status was taken into account.
To test hypothesis 5, we conducted a test for moderated
mediation, predicting that cognitive legitimacy (measured
via the IAT) would mediate normative legitimacy judgments
(as measured via the Elsbach scale) for nonusers but not
users. As in our first experiment, we used the bootstrapping
method to test for moderated mediation with same settings.
We first looked at the overall effect of frame label, user, and
their interaction on cognitive legitimacy. The overall model
was significant (F(3, 111) p 3.7, p p .01), and importantly
there was a significant interaction between user and frame
on cognitive legitimacy (b p .54, t p 3.1, p p .02).
We then looked at the effect of cognitive legitimacy, frame,
and user status on normative legitimacy. The model was
significant (F(4, 110) p 12.1), and the relationship between
cognitive and normative legitimacy was significant (b p
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FIGURE 6
IAT SCORES FOR GAMBLING VERSUS GAMING BY USER STATUS
.10.6, t p 4.8, p ! .001). However, the interaction be-
tween user and frame was not significant (b p 6.4, t p
1.5, p p .12). As Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) note, the
negative effect of one variable can sometimes cancel out
what appears to be an overall significant effect. In this sit-
uation, users and nonusers have different directionality in
terms of their reaction to the frame. Bootstrapping thus al-
lows us to parcel out the direct and indirect effects. Con-
ditional direct effects of frame on normative legitimacy for
nonusers were significant (b p 6.1, t p 2.3, p p .02, 95%
CI p .79 to 11.8), but were not significant for users (b p
.31, t p .09). Conditional indirect effects of frame on
normative legitimacy via cognitive legitimacy were signif-
icant for both groups and within confidence intervals not
containing zero; nonusers (b p 2.7, 95% CI p 3.62 to 5.8)
and users (b p 2.97, 95% CI p 6.7 to .44). Indirect
effects of the highest order interaction with cognitive le-
gitimacy as a mediator were significant (b p 5.7, 95% CI
p 2.26 to 10.42), confirming that cognitive legitimacy is
mediating normative legitimacy judgments overall once user
status is taken into account. This supports hypothesis 5.
Effects on Behavioral Intention. We expected the effects
of frame on normative legitimacy to exert downstream ef-
fects on behavioral intentions for nonusers (but not users).
We also expected that this would be mediated by implicit
associations (hypothesis 6). Normative legitimacy and be-
havioral intention were significantly correlated (r p .43)
for both user groups and more strongly related with nonusers
(rnonusers p .55) than users (rusers p .21, NS). In accordance
with hypothesis 6, we also considered the direct and indirect
impact of label on behavioral intentions. Again using
Preacher et al.’s (2007) procedure for testing moderated
mediation, we first looked at the relationship between cog-
nitive legitimacy, frame, and user on behavioral intention
(model significant at F(4, 110) p 15.7, p ! .0001). There
was a significant relationship between cognitive legitimacy
and behavioral intention (b p .1.1, t p 3.0, p ! .0001),
and we also found a significant interaction between user and
frame (b p 7.28, t p 5.8, p ! .0001). Both users and
nonusers showed significant direct effects (bnonusers p 3.3, t
p 4.2, p ! .0001, 95% CI p 1.11 to 4.92; busers p 3.9,
t p 4.19, p ! .0001, 95% CI p 5.79 to 2.07). Indirect
effects for both groups were also significant (bnonusers p .51
95%, CI p .069 to 1.15; busers p .55, 95% CI p 1.34
to .042). Indirect effects of the highest order interaction
with cognitive legitimacy as a mediator were significant (b
p 1.06, 95% CI p .33 to 2.12), confirming that cognitive
legitimacy mediates behavioral intentions overall but for
both user groups, but with different directionality. Thus hy-
pothesis 6 is supported, but the evidence here indicates that
frame affects users’ behavioral intentions as well. This sug-
gests that the new “gaming” label, while not as associated
with entertainment for users as “gambling,” has negative
effects on their normative and behavioral intentions. The
“gaming” frame, on the other hand, positively changes the
normative judgments and behavioral intentions of nonusers
working through cognitive legitimacy.
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Discussion
In experiment 2, we find that frame manipulated only by
label has a direct impact on the legitimacy judgments of
nonusers, with nonusers associating gaming more with the
legitimate field of practice. Users, on the other hand, are
more influenced by the old term, gambling. While users
might respond cognitively more favorably to “gambling,”
the use of this term clearly impedes normative legitimacy
judgments for nonusers. We find that the frame prompts
shifts in cognitive associations, which mediates normative
legitimacy judgments and behavioral intentions. Although
we did not find that cognitive shifts mediated behavioral
intentions in experiment 1, we did find such an effect in
experiment 2. There are several potential reasons for this.
First, experiment 2 provided a cleaner manipulation of frame
without attendant associations of risk that might have come
with manipulating frame through a story. Also note that the
correlation between our two questions for measuring be-
havioral intention is much higher in experiment 2 than ex-
periment 1 (r p .82 vs. r p .28). Thus our experiments
together show that frame affects judgments of normative
legitimacy for nonusers because it shifts cognitive associ-
ations, but the frame context may determine whether or not
this shift in normative judgment will carry over to behavioral
intentions.
Finding these labeling effects on nonusers has important
practical implications concerning the label for the industry.
The American Gaming Association (AGA) has been criti-
cized for aligning themselves with “gaming” rather than
“gambling.” Critics claim that this name change makes gam-
bling appear more recreational. Indeed, our media analysis
found that gaming is used more often in entertainment con-
texts than in crime stories. We further find that the term
“gaming” changes the implicit associations of nonusers. The
AGA claims that the term “gaming” preceded “gambling,”
and they are returning the practice to its original roots
(American Gaming Association 2012), but according to our
research they likely benefit from the label change. Whether
the online gambling industry should continue with the gam-
bling term or adopt the gaming term is not only an important
PR and public policy issue but may also guide how the
industry evolves, either as an extension of the current land
gambling industry or as part of an emerging social media
industry. Research has not previously explored how industry
labeling affects consumer views of legitimacy nor has it
considered how individual difference in knowledge and ex-
perience influences framing effects. We find that industry
label does matter and that user status is an important driver
for determining how the label is interpreted.
Further, effects of these shifts in judgment have important
implications when considered again from a sociocultural
perspective. If framing causes more nonusers to consider
the practice normatively legitimate, it may come to seem
more legitimate at the population level or achieve what John-
son et al. (2006) call general validation. As Weber (1922/
1978) and many other sociologists have noted, the judg-
ments of these types of social actors, those without explicit
instrumental interests, can have a profound effect on achiev-
ing perceptions of generalized legitimacy at the sociocultural
level (Johnson et al. 2006).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A number of moralists condemn lotteries and
refuse to see anything noble in the passion of
the ordinary gambler. They judge gambling as
some atheists judge religion, by its excesses.
(Attributed to Charles Lamb)
Gaming . . . corrupts our dispositions, and
teaches us a habit of hostility against all man-
kind. (Attributed to Thomas Jefferson, who
kept meticulous records of his card winnings)
As evidenced by the above quotations, the legitimacy of
gambling has been debated for centuries in the United States.
Our research concerns a relatively new form of gambling
—online gambling—and investigates how media framing
affects consumer perceptions of legitimacy. How do socio-
cultural representations affect individual assessments of le-
gitimacy? We find that frames present in the media—both
event sequence frames and frame labels—affect the implicit
associations of consumers. For nonusers, cognitive legitimacy
—the implicit associations with a particular type of consump-
tion—has a more dramatic impact on their normative judg-
ments and behavioral intentions.
The findings from this research contribute to our under-
standing of the legitimation process in several ways. First,
we find that nonusers respond differently to frames than
users. While previous research has investigated the tactics
of proponents for pursuing legitimacy (Coskuner-Balli and
Thompson 2013; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), we investi-
gate the development of cognitive and normative legitimacy
for different types of market actors. We find that nonusers,
whose judgments are important in creating a generalized sense
of appropriateness, are more sensitive to the effects of fram-
ing than users. Users, on the other hand, respond positively
to known terms. For them, old frames facilitate cognitive
processing while new terms impede it. One implication of
these differences is that users may sometimes impede le-
gitimacy by promoting a frame through word-of-mouth
communication or in media quotations that appeals to them
but negatively affects the judgments of nonusers. This could
pose a problem for the legitimation of the industry. Another
important implication of this difference among users and
nonusers is that changing the judgments of nonusers has
profound implications when considered recursively at the
sociocultural level. If nonusers are more susceptible to the
effects of framing, their support, which seems disinterested,
may come to make the practice seem more legitimate at the
generalized level.
Second, this research helps us understand more about
cognitive legitimacy, the process through which it is formed,
and the basis on which it is linked to judgments of normative
legitimacy. We find that media content using a legitimating
or delegitimating frame activates implicit associations that
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in turn affect legitimacy judgments for nonusers. We argue
that frames direct attention to particular aspects of a practice
and direct attention away from other aspects. Through this
process, consumers are inclined to group the focal industry
in different ways, depending on which aspects are high-
lighted. Although psychologists have amply demonstrated
the effects of priming on judgment and the effects of cat-
egorization on consumer expectation (Moreau et al. 2001),
they have not appreciated the consequences of these effects
for social processes like legitimation. In this research, we
find that framing affects nonusers disproportionally and
prompts shifts not only in normative judgment but also in
intended behavior.
Third, this research provides an innovation in the mea-
surement of cognitive legitimacy. While previous research
has only proposed proxy measures at the population level,
we find that the subtle effects of framing on cognitive le-
gitimacy can be captured with implicit measures like the
IAT. Proponents of the IAT have suggested that language
can frame implicit cognitions (Ogunnaike, Dunham, and
Banaji 2010), which supports the Whorfian hypothesis of
linguistic relativity (Whorf 1956), the idea that language
shapes deeper cognitive structures. Consumer researchers
have demonstrated that one’s native language can influence
associative relations (Schmitt and Zhang 1998), and here
we suggest that media frames shape cognitive processes in
similar ways by directing attention to some aspects of ex-
perience and away from others, thus affecting cognitive le-
gitimacy. Our research uses the IAT to demonstrate that the
media’s choice of language can affect consumer perceptions
of legitimacy, and we believe this is the first demonstration
using the test in such a manner.
Finally, our findings demonstrate the potential fluidity of
legitimacy perceptions. Whereas previous research has shown
fluidity of legitimacy over a few years (Giesler 2012), we
find that framing produces immediate, readily observable ef-
fects in the legitimacy judgments of nonusers. Further support
for this fluidity was found, for instance, in our pretest of
the Elsbach scale where we chose industries that had either
already attained legitimacy (such as the Hollywood movie
industry) or might never attain it (such as drug trafficking).
And while each industry was rated as expected, there were
comments suggesting that even these industries may be
prone to shifts in legitimacy. In the case of Hollywood, for
example, there were some who questioned the film indus-
try’s treatment of employees and suggested that this could
lead to illegitimacy. Conversely, some noted that even the
drug trafficking industry possesses some elements of legit-
imacy, such as having rules and norms. Thus we believe
that legitimacy, though a representation of a “social fact”
(Durkheim 1895/1982), is subject to fluctuations depending
on which aspects of a practice are emphasized and how
these associations are reinforced and codified over time.
A few limitations to this research exist and should be
noted. First, we studied the legitimacy of a particular kind
of industry, one that has some new and some old elements.
While some studies of legitimation have analyzed the emer-
gence of previously unknown industries (Aldrich and Fiol
1994; Rao 2002), others have studied the legitimation of
known but previously illegitimate industries (Humphreys
2010b; Jensen 2010). Although both require a shift in cog-
nitive structures, cases of illegitimacy and nonlegitimacy
have important differences. Specifically, while illegitimate
industries need to change some established cognitive struc-
tures, nonlegitimate industries need merely to establish new
structures and connect with old ones. Both processes present
unique cognitive challenges. On the one hand, previously
unknown industries must educate social actors at organi-
zational, intra-industry, inter-industry, and institutional lev-
els (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). On the other hand, known but
illicit industries must change relatively stable knowledge
structures on each sociopolitical level (Humphreys 2010b).
Online gambling is a somewhat hybrid case. On the one
hand, it has ties to the previously stigmatized gambling in-
dustry that make it seem normatively illegitimate. On the
other hand, many consumers do not know much about the
practice and have not participated in it, and models for en-
gaging in online gambling may be opaque. This lack of
knowledge or experience presents challenges similar to those
faced by nonlegitimate or new industries.
Second, our studies did not extensively evaluate the views
of nongamblers, those who have no experience gambling or
who might be strongly opposed to the practice. We might
expect that the normative judgments of these types of market
actors would not change, even though we may observe sim-
ilar effects of framing on cognitive associations as found
with current users.
This research suggests several fruitful avenues for future
investigation. First, although we have shown that frames
can affect legitimation judgments on the individual level
and that they do so by shifting implicit associations, the
longitudinal effects of framing on the individual level have
not been investigated. Results from our event study suggest
that our findings have external validity, but future research
could investigate these long-term effects by studying media
exposure and legitimacy judgments over time, especially for
users. Here we found that cognitive associations of users
shifted, but these did not immediately translate to changes
in normative judgment. Does framing have a lasting impact
on perceptions or does it require reinforcement over time?
Second, we have begun to investigate the critical role
that language plays in shaping consumer attitudes. There
is great promise for using theories and methods from lin-
guistics and rhetoric to understand consumer behavior,
which could include not only individual-level analyses but
macro level historical linguistic and textual analyses as
well. Consider, for example, the effects of labeling found
in experiment 2. How might labeling subtly affect food
choice (see, e.g., Keller, Sternthal, and Tybout 2002; Rag-
hunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer 2006) or brand image? From
a public policy perspective, labeling can equally work in
the interest of opponents to an industry. Consider the case
of fracking. Although industry actors have searched for a
replacement term, the practice of extracting energy from
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below the earth’s surface has become known as fracking,
which carries with it rhetorical connotations of fracturing
naturally existing rock. This label brings with it obvious
cognitive associations, in this case through phonetic simi-
larities between words, which galvanize public opinion
about the legitimacy of the industry.
Another promising avenue of research concerns the le-
gitimation of nonterritorialized industries such as online
gambling. One key route through which consumers make
inferences about the association between white collar crime
and online gambling is through the depersonalization facil-
itated by the Internet. Understanding more about the tensions
surrounding the legitimation of computer-mediated indus-
tries has potential implications for the future entrenchment
and thus value of social networking sites like Facebook and
companies like Groupon. How is the legitimation process
different when consumption activities and infrastructure are
less public and less tied to physical institutions?
Finally, institutional questions remain. One important as-
pect of legitimating online gambling is strategically refram-
ing it from crime and toward some other legitimating in-
stitution, as lotteries have done through their association
with state education, or land casinos have done by posi-
tioning themselves with theme parks. It had been assumed
that the reigning US casino industry would lead the online
gambling industry if it became legalized. However, refram-
ing online gambling may mean redefining the institutions
involved (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005). For online gam-
bling, this may mean breaking away from the current gam-
bling industry and realigning with other online platforms.
It appears that social networking sites may be in a more
strategically advantageous position to do this sort of re-
framing, and the “gaming” label might facilitate that asso-
ciation. Zynga CEO Mark Pincus has described online gam-
bling as a “natural fit” with his games. Zynga already has
the largest online poker game in the world, but Pincus is
planning on developing games beyond traditional casino
games (Lynley 2012). These strategic framing battles are
equally important for those opposing online gambling, who
need to find ways to reframe gambling toward social prob-
lems and countervailing sociocultural norms. These activists
also need to be aware of potentially advantageous routes
through which gambling might gain legitimacy.
Our research has shown that representations existing on
the sociocultural level can influence individual consumer
perceptions of legitimacy. Consumer acceptance of and par-
ticipation in online gambling is influenced by the ways in
which it is represented culturally and socially. Not only are
these effects practically and theoretically important, but they
also illustrate the value of considering consumption phe-
nomena from multiple disciplinary perspectives. Both so-
ciologists and psychologists have something valuable to add
to our understanding of the ways consumer behavior is struc-
tured and changes throughout history.
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USA Today (1989), “Briefly,” February 8, 2A.
USA Today (1990), “Nationline,” Paul Levitt, January 10,
3A.
New York Times (1991), “Executive Changes,” April 6.
Wall Street Journal (1992), “Caesars World’s Strategy Is
Bringing Back Past Glory,” February 20.
Wall Street Journal (1993), “Hilton Hotels Corp.: Firm
to Develop Properties in Las Vegas for Time Shares,” Feb-
ruary 2.
USA Today (1993), “The $100 Million Dream,” July 8,
10A.
New York Times (1995), “Casinos Threaten Pageant as
Symbol of Atlantic City,” John Nordheimer, September 16,
A24.
USA Today (1996), “‘I Won the Lottery,’ $9,095,073.60,
‘I ran down the hall to the bathroom,’” January 26.
USA Today (2004) “Gaming Companies Rolling Up Wins
on Revenue; Casino Stocks Hit Aces with Increases,” Matt
Krantz, June 8, B3.
New York Times (2004), “Gambling Sites Offering Ways
to Let Any User Be the Bookie,” July 6, C1.
APPENDIX B
LEGITIMATION MEASURES ADAPTED
FROM ELSBACH (1994)
(1 p strongly disagree, 7 p strongly agree)
1. The general public approves of the ONLINE
GAMBLING industry’s operating procedures.
2. The ONLINE GAMBLING industry follows gov-
ernment regulations for operating procedures.
3. Casino workers support the ONLINE GAM-
BLING industry’s operating decisions.
4. Most of the ONLINE GAMBLING industry’s em-
ployees would recommend working in this indus-
try to their friends.
5. Most of the general public would approve of the
ONLINE GAMBLING industry if asked their
opinion.
6. The ONLINE GAMBLING industry is committed
to meeting casino industry standards in its oper-
ations.
7. Most employees would continue working in the
ONLINE GAMBLING industry even if they could
get a job with any other organization in the casino
industry.
8. The ONLINE GAMBLING sites are concerned
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with meeting acceptable standards for ethical be-
havior, fair play, and nonpredatory practices.
9. The ONLINE GAMBLING industry is viewed by
business writers as one of the top fields in the
gambling industry.
10. The ONLINE GAMBLING industry’s leaders be-
lieve in “playing by the rules” and following ac-
cepted operating guidelines.
11. The ONLINE GAMBLING industry has one of
the lowest rates of employee turnover in the gam-
bling industry.
12. Most consumers in the general public approve of
the ONLINE GAMBLING’s industry’s operating
practices.
Pretest of Elsbach Scale
Before conducting experiments, we wanted to pretest our
measures for legitimacy to ensure that they were valid mea-
sures of their constructs. Using an online sample of 51 con-
sumers, we asked them to assess several industries: a well-
known, legitimate practice (the Hollywood movie industry),
a known illegitimate practice (drug trafficking), and two
industries negotiating legitimacy (Botox and online casinos).
For the Elsbach scale, we found in an exploratory factor
analysis that the 12 items all loaded highest on a single
factor, Cronbach a p .95. We summed these items for an
overall index of legitimacy.
As expected, the Hollywood movie industry had the high-
est means overall (Mmovies p 63.5), and drug trafficking
scored the lowest (Mdrugs p 23.03). Both the Botox and
online casino industry were between these industries (MBotox
p 49.27, Monline gambling p 41.82). Pairwise comparisons on
the Elsbach measure for all industries were significantly
different (p ! .05). Based on these findings, we felt that the
Elsbach scale would be appropriate for measuring the le-
gitimacy of online gambling.
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